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On Privacy of Dynamical Systems: An Optimal
Probabilistic Mapping Approach
Carlos Murguia, Iman Shames, Farhad Farokhi, Dragan Nesˇic´, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract—We address the problem of maximizing privacy of
stochastic dynamical systems whose state information is released
through quantized sensor data. In particular, we consider the
setting where information about the system state is obtained
using noisy sensor measurements. This data is quantized and
transmitted to a remote station through a public/unsecured
communication network. We aim at keeping the state of the
system private; however, because the network is not secure,
adversaries might have access to sensor data, which can be used
to estimate the system state. To prevent such adversaries from
obtaining an accurate state estimate, before transmission, we
randomize quantized sensor data using additive random vectors,
and send the corrupted data to the remote station instead. We
design the joint probability distribution of these additive vectors
(over a time window) to minimize the mutual information (our
privacy metric) between some linear function of the system
state (a desired private output) and the randomized sensor data
for a desired level of distortion–how different quantized sensor
measurements and distorted data are allowed to be. We pose the
problem of synthesising the joint probability distribution of the
additive vectors as a convex program subject to linear constraints.
Simulation experiments are presented to illustrate our privacy
scheme.
Index Terms—Privacy; Dynamical Systems, Quantization, Mu-
tual Information.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a hyperconnected world, scientific and technological
advances have led to an overwhelming amount of user data
being collected and processed by hundreds of companies
over public networks. Companies mine this data to provide
personalized services. However, these new technologies have
also led to an alarming widespread loss of privacy in society
and vulnerabilities within critical infrastructure – e.g., power,
water, transportation. Depending on adversaries resources,
opponents may infer critical (private) information about the
operation of systems from public data available on the internet
and unsecured/public servers and communication networks. A
motivating example of this privacy loss is the potential use
of data from smart electrical meters by criminals, advertising
agencies, and governments, for monitoring the presence and
activities of occupants [1], [2]. Other examples are privacy loss
Carlos Murguia is with the Department of Electrical Engineering,
University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA, e-mail: cmur-
guia1984@g.ucla.edu.
Iman Shames, Farhad Farokhi, and Dragan Nesˇic´ are with the De-
partment of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, The University of
Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia, e-mails: iman.shames@unimelb.edu.au,
farhad.farokhi@unimelb.edu.au, and dnesic@unimelb.edu.au.
Vincent Poor is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton
University, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA, e-mail: poor@princeton.edu.
Manuscript received October 25, 2019; revised October 26, 2019.
caused by information sharing in distributed control systems
and cloud computing [3]; the use of travel data for traffic esti-
mation in intelligent transportation systems [4]; and data col-
lection and sharing by the Internet-of-Things (IoT) [5], which
is, most of the time, done without the users informed consent.
These privacy concerns show that there is an acute need for
privacy preserving mechanisms capable of handling the new
privacy challenges induced by an interconnected world, which,
in turn, has attracted the attention of researchers from different
fields (e.g., computer science, information theory, and control
theory) in the broad area of privacy and security of Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPSs) – engineered systems that integrate
computation, networking, and dynamic physical components
– see, e.g., [6]-[23].
In most engineering applications, information about the state
of systems, say X , is obtained through sensor measurements.
Once this information is collected, it is usually quantized,
encoded, and sent to a remote station for signal processing and
decision-making purposes through communication networks.
Examples of such systems are numerous: water and electricity
consumption meters, traffic monitoring systems, industrial
control systems, and so on. If the communication network
is public or unsecured, adversaries might access and estimate
the state of the system. To avoid an accurate state estimation,
before transmission, we randomize quantized sensor data using
additive random vectors and send the corrupted data to the
remote station instead. These vectors are designed to hide
(as much as possible) the private part of the state S – a
desired private output modeled as some linear function of
the system state, S = DX , for some deterministic matrix
D. Note, however, that it is not desired to overly distort the
original sensor data. We might change the data excessively
for practical purposes. Hence, when selecting the additive
distorting vectors, we need to take into account the trade-off
between privacy and distortion. As distortion metric, we use
the mean squared error between the original sensor data, Y ,
and its randomized version, Z = G(Y ), for some probabilistic
mapping G(·). In this manuscript, we follow an information-
theoretic approach to privacy. As privacy metric, we propose
the mutual information [24], I[S˜;Z], between a quantized
version S˜ of the private output S and the disclosed randomized
sensor data Z = G(Y ) (over a finite time window). Mutual
information I[V ;W ] between two jointly distributed vectors,
V and W , is a measure of the statistical dependence between
V and W [24]. We design the joint probability distribution
of the distorting additive vectors to minimize I[S˜;Z] (over a
time window), for a desired level of distortion – how different
quantized sensor measurements and distorted data are allowed
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to be. We pose the problem of synthesising the joint probability
distribution of these additive vectors as a convex program
subject to linear constraints.
Using additive random vectors to increase privacy is com-
mon practice. In the context of privacy of databases, a popular
approach is differential privacy [19], [25], where random noise
is added to the response of queries so that private information
stored in the database cannot be inferred. In differential pri-
vacy, because it provides certain privacy guarantees, Laplace
noise is usually used [26]. However, when maximal privacy
with minimal distortion is desired, Laplace noise is generally
not the optimal solution. This raises the fundamental question:
for a given allowable distortion level, what is the noise
distribution achieving maximal privacy? This question has
many possible answers depending on the particular privacy and
distortion metrics being considered and the system configura-
tion [27]-[30]. There are also results addressing this question
from an information theoretic perspective, where information
metrics – e.g., mutual information, entropy, Kullback-Leibler
divergence, and Fisher information – are used to quantify
privacy [1], [2], [6], [8], [10], [18], [31], [32].
In general, if the data to be kept private follows continuous
probability distributions, the problem of finding the optimal
additive noise to maximize privacy (even without considering
distortion) is hard to solve. If a close-form solution for the
distribution is desired, the problem amounts to solving a set of
nonlinear partial differential equations which, in general, might
not have a solution, and even if they do have a solution, it is
hard to find [6]. This problem has been addressed by imposing
some particular structure on the considered distributions or
assuming the data to be kept private is deterministic [6], [28],
[29].
The authors in [28], [29] consider deterministic input data
sets and treat optimal distributions as distributions that con-
centrate probability around zero as much as possible while
ensuring differential privacy. Under this framework, they ob-
tain a family of piecewise constant density functions that
achieve minimal distortion for a given level of privacy. In [6],
the authors consider the problem of preserving the privacy
of deterministic databases using constrained additive noise.
They use the Fisher information and the Cramer-Rao bound
to construct a privacy metric between noise-free data and the
one with the additive noise and find the probability density
function that minimizes it. Moreover, they prove that, in the
unconstrained case, the optimal noise distribution minimizing
the Fisher information is Gaussian. This observation has also
been made in [33] when using mutual information as a
measure of privacy.
Most of the aforementioned papers propose optimal con-
tinuous distributions assuming deterministic data. However,
in a Cyber-Physical-Systems context, the inherent system
dynamics and unavoidable system and sensor noise lead to
stochastic non-stationary data and thus existing tools do not fit
this setting. Here, we identify two possibilities for addressing
our problem: 1) we might inject continuous noise to sensor
measurements, then quantize the sum, and send it over the
unsecured/public network; or 2), the one considered here,
quantize sensor measurements, randomize quantized sensor
data using additive random vectors with discrete distributions,
and send the randomized data over the network. As motivated
above, to address the first option, even assuming deterministic
sensor data, we have to impose some particular structure on
the distributions of the additive noise; and, if sensor data is
stochastic, the problem becomes hard to solve (sometimes
even untractable). As we prove in this manuscript, if we select
the second alternative, under some mild assumptions on the
system dynamics and the additive distorting vectors, we can
cast the problem of finding the optimal additive vectors as a
constrained convex optimization. To the best of the authors
knowledge, this problem has not been considered before as it
is posed it here.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
The Euclidian norm in Rn is denoted by ||X ||, ||X ||2 =
X⊤X , where ⊤ denotes transposition. The n × n identity
matrix is denoted by In or simply I if n is clear from the
context. Similarly, n × m matrices composed of only ones
and only zeros are denoted by 1n×m and 0n×m, respectively,
or simply 1 and 0 when their dimensions are clear. For
positive definite (semidefinite) matrices, we use the notation
P > 0 (P ≥ 0); moreover, P > Q (P ≥ Q) means
that the matrix P − Q is positive definite (semidefinite).
For any two matrices A and B, the notation A ⊗ B (the
Kronecker product [34]) stands for the matrix composed of
submatrices AijB , where Aij , i, j = 1, ..., n, stands for
the ijth entry of the n × n matrix A. Consider a discrete
random vector X with alphabet X = {x1, . . . , xN}, xi ∈ Rm,
m,N ∈ N, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and probability mass function
(pmf) p(x) = Pr[X = x], x ∈ X , where Pr[B] denotes
probability of eventB. We denote its probability mass function
by p(x) rather than pX(x) to simplify notation. Thus, p(x)
and p(y) refer to two different random vectors, and are, in
fact, different probability mass functions, pX(x) and pY (y),
respectively. For a discrete stochastic process X(k) taking
values from the alphabet Xk ⊂ Rm, we denote its probability
mass function as pk(x(k)) = Pr[X(k) = x(k)], x(k) ∈ Xk.
For simplicity of notation, if the alphabet of X(k) is time-
invariant and finite, i.e., Xk = X := {x1, . . . , xN}, xi ∈ Rm,
for some finite m,N ∈ N, we write its pmf at time k as
pk(x) = Pr[X(k) = x], x ∈ X . We denote by ”Simplex” the
probability simplex defined by
∑
x∈X p(x) = 1, p(x) ≥ 0
for all x ∈ X . The notation X ∼ N [µ,ΣX ] means that
X ∈ Rn is a normally distributed random vector with mean
E[X ] = µ ∈ Rn and covariance matrix E[(X−µ)(X−µ)T ] =
ΣX ∈ Rn×n, where E[a] denotes the expected value of
the random vector a. We denote independence between two
random vectors, X and Y , as X |= Y . Finite sequences of
vectors are written as XK := (X(1)⊤, . . . , X(K)⊤)⊤ ∈ RKn
and XK2K1 := (X(K1)
⊤, . . . , X(K2)
⊤)⊤ ∈ R(K2−K1)n with
K2 > K1, X(i) ∈ R
n, and n,K,K1,K2 ∈ N. To avoid
confusion, we denote powers of matrices as (A)K = A · · ·A
(K times) for K > 0, (A)0 = I , and (A)K = 0 for K < 0.
Given two numbers a and b, b > 0, the notation amod b stands
for a modulo b, and for a vector a = (a1, . . . , an)
⊤, ai ∈ R>0,
i = 1, . . . , n, amod b = (a1 mod b, . . . , an mod b)
⊤.
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Fig. 1: System Configuration.
B. Mutual Information
Definition 1 [24] Consider discrete random vectors, X and
Y , with joint probability mass function p(x, y) and marginal
probability mass functions, p(x) and p(y), respectively. Their
mutual information I[X ;Y ] is defined as the relative entropy
between the joint distribution and the product distribution
p(x)p(y): I[X ;Y ] :=
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y p(x, y) log
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y) .
The mutual information I[X ;Y ] between two jointly dis-
tributed vectors, X and Y , is a measure of the statistical
dependence between X and Y .
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Description, Quantization, and Stochastic Map-
pings
We study discrete-time stochastic systems of the form:

X(k + 1) = AX(k) +BU(k) +M(k),
Y (k) = CX(k) +W (k),
S(k) = DX(k),
(1)
with time-instants k ∈ N, stateX ∈ Rnx , nx ∈ N, output Y ∈
R
ny , ny ∈ N, performance (private) output S ∈ Rns , ns ∈ N,
stochastic disturbances M ∈ Rnx and W ∈ Rny , reference
signal U ∈ Rnu , nu ∈ N, and matrices A ∈ Rnx×nx , B ∈
R
nx×nu , C ∈ Rny×nx , and D ∈ Rns×nx . Matrix D is full
row rank. The perturbations M(k) and W (k) are i.i.d. multi-
variate Gaussian processes with E[M(k)] = 0, E[W (k)] = 0,
and covariance matrices ΣM := E[M(k)M(k)⊤] ∈ Rnx×nx ,
ΣM > 0, and ΣW := E[W (k)W (k)⊤] ∈ Rny×ny , ΣW > 0.
The initial state X(1) is assumed to be a Gaussian random
vector with E[X(1)] = µX1 ∈ R
nx and covariance matrix
ΣX1 := E[(X(1)− µ
X
1 )(X(1) − µ
X
1 )
⊤] ∈ Rnx×nx , ΣX1 > 0.
The processes M(k), k ∈ N and W (k), k ∈ N, and the
initial condition X(1) are mutually independent. It is assumed
that the matrices (vectors) (A,B,C,D,ΣX1 , µ
X
1 ,Σ
M ,ΣW )
are known, and the reference signal U(k) is known and
deterministic.
Sensor measurements Y (k) ∈ Rny are quantized using a
vector regular quantizer [35] QY (Y (k), NY , C,Y):
Y˜ (k) = QY (Y (k), NY , C,Y) :=


y1, if Y (k) ∈ c1,
.
..
yNY , if Y (k) ∈ cNY ,
(2)
with quantization levels yj ∈ Rny , j = 1, 2, . . . , NY , quan-
tization cells cj ⊂ Rny ,
⋃
j cj = R
ny ,
⋂
j cj = ∅, set of
quantization cells C := {c1, . . . , cNY }, and set of quantization
levels Y := {y1, . . . , yNY }. That is, the vector of quantized
sensor measurements, Y˜ (k) = QY (Y (k), NY , C,Y) ∈ Y ,
is parametrized by the quantization levels yj ∈ Rny , the
quantization cells cj ⊂ Rny , j = 1, . . . , NY , and the number
of cells NY ∈ N. Note that, if we know the multivariate
probability density fk(y(k)) of Y (k) and the quantizer, we
can always obtain the probability mass function pk(y˜(k)) of
Y˜ (k) by integrating fk(y(k)) over the quantization cells cj ,
j = 1, . . . , NY . Moreover, the alphabet of the discrete multi-
variate random process Y˜ (k) is given by the set of quantization
levels Y . Because Y is time-invariant by construction, we write
the pmf of Y˜ (k) as pk(y˜), y˜ ∈ Y , i.e., pk(y˜) = Pr[Y˜ (k) = y˜]
for all y˜ ∈ Y .
After Y (k) is quantized, we pass Y˜ (k) through a stochastic
mapping G : N × Y → Y characterized by the transition
probabilities pk(z|y˜) = Pr[Z(k) = z|Y˜ (k) = y˜], y˜, z ∈ Y ,
i.e., Z(k) = G(k, Y˜ (k)) ∈ Y , see Figure 2. The vector Z(k)
is transmitted over an unsecured communication network to
a remote station, see Figure 1. Note that, even by passing
Y˜ (k) through G(k, ·) before transmission, information about
the private output S(k) is directly accessible through Z(k) at
the unsecured network. Here, we aim at finding the mapping
G(k, ·) (the transition probabilities pk(z|y˜)) that minimizes
this information leakage. Note, however, that we do not want
to make Y˜ (k) and Z(k) overly different either. By passing
Y˜ (k) through G(k, ·), we might distort Y˜ (k) excessively for
practical purposes. Hence, when designing the distribution
pk(z|y˜), we need to consider the trade-off between privacy
and distortion.
B. Metrics and Problem Formulation
For given time horizon K ∈ N, the aim of our privacy
scheme is to make inference of the sequence of private vectors
SK = (S(1)⊤, . . . , S(K)⊤)⊤ from the distorted sequence
ZK = (Z(1)⊤, . . . , Z(K)⊤)⊤ as hard as possible without
distorting Y˜ K = (Y˜ (1)⊤, . . . , Y˜ (K)⊤)⊤ excessively. As
distortion metric, we use the stacked mean squared error:
E[||ZK − Y˜ K ||2]; and, as privacy metrics, the mutual in-
formation I[S˜K ;ZK ], where S˜K = (S˜(1)⊤, . . . , S˜(K)⊤)⊤
and S˜(i) ∈ Rns denotes a quantized version of the private
output S(i), i = 1, . . . ,K . A natural question arises here:
Why don’t we directly use I[SK ;ZK ] as privacy metric?
Note that, because X(1), M(k), and W (k) are Gaussian,
SK is jointly normally distributed. Moreover, ZK is a dis-
crete random vector which conditional distribution depends
on the quantizer, QY (Y (k), NY , C,Y), and the density of
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Fig. 2: Probabilistic Mapping.
Y (k). Hence, I[SK ;ZK ] would denote the mutual information
between continuous and discrete random vectors. This type
of mutual information is not always well defined. There are
some hybrid definitions available in the literature that have
been used to estimate mutual information between continuous
and discrete data sets [36]-[40]. However, we prefer to avoid
using hybrid formulations, because they lead to complicated
expressions which are hard to evaluate, and work directly with
the definition of mutual information introduced by Shannon for
discrete random vectors (given in Definition 1) by discretizing
the density of S(k) to compute I[S˜K ;ZK ].
Summarizing the above discussion, we aim at minimizing
I[S˜K ;ZK ] subject to E[||ZK − Y˜ K ||2] ≤ ǫK , for a desired
level of distortion ǫK ∈ R>0, using as decision variables the
conditional probability mass function p(zK |y˜K) = Pr[ZK =
zK |Y˜ K = y˜K ], where zK , y˜K ∈ YK := Y×. . .×Y (K times)
and elements of YK belong to RKny , i.e., since Y˜ (k) and
Z(k) have alphabet Y , k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the stacked vectors
YK and ZK have alphabet YK .
Remark 1 The number of optimization variables p(zK |y˜K)
depends on the number of quantization levels NY and the
horizon K . Both stacked vectors Y K and ZK take values
from the alphabet YK = Y × . . .×Y (K times) and because
Y is the set of NY quantization levels, YK has (NY )K ele-
ments. We aim at computing an optimal transition probability
p(zK |y˜K) from each element of the alphabet of Y K to every
element of the alphabet of ZK . Therefore, we have (NKY )
2
optimization variables to minimize I[SˆK(Y˜ K); SˆK(ZK)] and
I[S˜K ;ZK ]. This is already a large-scale optimization problem
for quantizers with moderate resolution and fairly small K .
For instance, a 3-bit quantizer (NY = 8) and a horizon of
K = 5 requires more than a billion variables. A possible
solution to this dimensionality problem is to impose some
structure on p(zK |y˜K) to reduce the number of variables.
That is, we could set some of the transition probabilities to a
constant known value a priori, and use the remaining ones to
minimize the mutual information. In what follows, we propose
a systematic way to achieve this using an additive random
process. We impose structure to the probabilistic mapping
G(k, :) (see Figure 1) so that the number of variables in
p(zK |y˜K) is reduced from (NY )2K to (NY )K .
The proposed probabilistic mapping G(k, ·) consists of the
following three objects: 1) a coding function α : Y →
{0, 1, . . . , NY − 1} =: Y¯ that indexes each element of Y;
2) a discrete random process V (k), independent of Y˜ (k) for
all k ∈ N, with alphabet V := {0, 1, . . . , NV − 1}, NV ∈ N,
and probability mass function qk(v), v ∈ V (the pmf of V (k)
is denoted as qk(v) rather than pk(v) because, in what follows,
we use qk(v) as optimization variables and we want to clearly
distinguish qk(v) from other probability mass functions); and
3) a decoding function β : {0, 1, . . . , NY − 1} → Y .
We characterize each of these objects before introducing the
mapping G(k, ·). The indexing (coding) function α : Y → Y¯
is defined as
α(ζ) :=


0, if ζ = y1,
..
.
NY − 1, if ζ = yNY .
(3)
For given Y˜ (k) ∈ Y and corresponding α(Y˜ (k)) ∈
{0, 1, . . . , NY − 1}, we add a realization of the process
V (k) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , NV −1} to randomize α(Y˜ (k)), and project
the sum onto the ring {0, 1, . . . , NY − 1}, i.e., (α(Y˜ (k)) +
Vk)modNY ∈ Y , where modNY denotes modulo NY . We
project α(Y˜ (k))+Vk onto Y to ensure that Z(k) has the same
alphabet as Y˜ (k). Then, we decode the sum using the function
β : Y¯ → Y defined as
β
(
ξ) :=


y1, if ξ = 0,
...
yNY , if ξ = NY − 1.
(4)
Note that β(α(ζ)) = ζ and α(β(ξ)) = ξ. We construct the
mapping G : N × Y → Y , Y˜ (k) 7→ G(k, Y˜ (k)), combining
(3) and (4) as follows
Z(k) = G(k, Y˜ (k)) := β
(
(α(Y˜ (k)) + V (k))modNY
)
. (5)
In Figure 3, we depict a schematic diagram of the mapping
G(k, ·). Since α(·) and β(·) are fixed injective functions,
we can only use the probability mass function qk(v) =
Pr[V (k) = v], v ∈ V = {0, 1, . . . , NV − 1}, to minimize
I[SˆK(Y˜ K); SˆK(ZK)] and I[S˜K ;ZK ]. For given time horizon
K ∈ N, let V K = (V (1)⊤, . . . , V (K)⊤)⊤, and denote its
probability mass function as q(vK) = Pr[V K = vK ], where
vK ∈ VK := V×. . .×V (K times) and elements of VK belong
to RK , i.e., since V (k) has alphabet V , k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
the stacked vector V K has alphabet VK . In what follows, we
formally present the optimization problems we seek to address.
Problem 1 Given the system dynamics (1), sensor quantizer
(2), time horizon K ∈ N, desired distortion level ǫK ∈ R≥0,
quantized version S˜(k) of S(k), k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and the
probabilistic mapping (3)-(5), find the probability mass func-
tion q(vK) solution of the following optimization problem:

min
q(vK)
I[S˜K ;ZK ],
s.t. E[||ZK − Y˜ K ||2] ≤ ǫK ,
V K |= Y˜
K , and q(vK) ∈ Simplex.
(6)
IV. SOLUTION TO PROBLEM 1
Consider the cost function I[S˜K ;ZK ] for some quantized
version S˜K of the stacked private output SK , and the system
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Fig. 3: Schematic diagram of the mapping G(k, ·).
dynamics (1). At time k, S(k) can be written in terms
of the initial condition, the stacked reference Uk−1, and
the stacked disturbance Mk−1 as S(k) = DAk−1X(1) +∑k−2
i=0 DM(k − 1 − i) + DU(k − 1 − i), i.e., S(k) is the
sum of independent Gaussian random vectors (and thus it is
also Gaussian). It follows that the support of S(k) is the whole
Rns . To discretize the density of S(k), we divide its support
into a finite set of cells. Let H := {h1, . . . , hNS} denote
a set of NS ∈ N quantization cells satisfying: hj ⊂ Rns ,⋃
j hj = R
ns ,
⋂
j hj = ∅. Associated with each cell hj , we
introduce the corresponding quantization level sj ∈ hj ⊂ Rns ,
i.e., sj denotes a ns-dimensional point in the interior of hj ,
j ∈ {1, . . . , NS}. We collect all the quantization levels into the
set S := {s1, . . . , sNS}. Then, the quantized private output,
S˜(k) ∈ Rns , can be written as
S˜(k) = QS(S(k), NS ,H,S) :=


s1, if S(k) ∈ h1,
...
sNS , if S(k) ∈ hNS .
(7)
Denote the stacked vector of quantized private outputs as
S˜K = (S˜(1)⊤, . . . , S˜(K)⊤)⊤ ∈ RKns . Note that if we know
the joint probability density function of SK , once we have
fixed the quantizer QS(·), we can obtain the probability mass
function p(s˜K) = Pr[S˜K = s˜K ], s˜K ∈ SK := S× . . .×S (K
times) by integrating the density of SK over the cells inH. For
the discrete random vector S˜K , we have a well defined mutual
information I[S˜K ;ZK ]. By Definition 1, the cost I[S˜K ;ZK ]
is a function of p(s˜K , zK), and the marginals p(s˜K) and
p(zK). However, to minimize I[S˜K ;ZK ], we need to write
it in terms of q(vK) (our design variables). Notice that, if the
joint density of SY and Y K is a non-degenerate Gaussian,
we can numerically compute p(s˜K |y˜K) for any s˜K ∈ SK
and y˜K ∈ YK ; and that, because (by construction) S˜(k) and
Z(k) are conditionally independent given Y˜ (k), S˜K and ZK
are conditionally independent given Y˜ K . The latter implies
that p(s˜K , zK) =
∑
y˜K∈YK p(y˜
K)p(s˜K |y˜K)p(zK |y˜K).
Then, for given p(y˜K) and p(s˜K |y˜K), we can write the
cost I[S˜K ;ZK ] in terms of p(zK |y˜K) and q(vK). In the
following lemma, we write the cost function I[Y˜ K ;ZK ]
in terms of q(vK), and prove that it is convex in q(vK).
Before stating the lemma, we need some extra notation.
For any ζK = (ζ(1)⊤, . . . , ζ(K)⊤)⊤ ∈ YK , ζ(i) ∈ Y ,
i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, define the stacked indexing function
α¯ : YK → Y¯K , with Y¯K := Y¯ × · · · × Y¯ (K times) and
Y¯ = {0, . . . , NY − 1}, as:
α¯(ζK) := (α(ζ(1)), . . . , α(ζ(K)))⊤, (8)
where α(·) is the indexing function defined in (3).
Lemma 1 I[S˜K ;ZK ] is a convex function of q(vK) for given
p(s˜K |y˜K) and p(y˜K), and is written as:
I[S˜K ;ZK ] =
∑
zK∈YK
∑
s˜K∈SK
p(s˜K)p(zK |s˜K) log
p(zK |s˜K)
p(zK)
,
(9a)
p(zK |s˜K) =
∑
y˜K∈YK
p(y˜K |s˜K)p(zK |y˜K), (9b)
p(zK) =
∑
s˜K∈SK
∑
y˜K∈YK
p(s˜K)p(y˜K |s˜K)p(zK |y˜K), (9c)
p(zK |y˜K) = q
(
(α¯(zK)− α¯(y˜K))modNY
)
, (9d)
where α¯ : YK → Y¯K denotes the stacked indexing function
defined in (8).
Proof : The expression on the right-hand side of (9a) follows
by inspection of Definition 1, and the fact that p(s˜K , zK) =
p(s˜K)p(zK |s˜K) (chain rule). By [24, Theorem 2.7.4], cost
(9a) is convex in p(zK |s˜K) for given p(s˜K). However, our
optimization variables are q(vK) and not p(zK |s˜K). By con-
struction, S˜K and ZK are conditionally independent given Y˜ K
[41]; therefore, p(s˜K , y˜K , zK) = p(s˜K)p(y˜K |s˜K)p(zK |y˜K).
Using this expression for p(s˜K , y˜K , zK), we can write (9b)
and (9c) by conditioning and marginalizing the joint distri-
bution. It follows that, by combining (9a)-(9c), we can write
I[S˜K ;ZK ] in terms of p(zK |y˜K), p(y˜K |s˜K), and p(s˜K), i.e.,
the cost is a function of p(zK |y˜K) and it is parametrized by
p(y˜K |s˜K) and p(s˜K). Convexity with respect to p(zK |y˜K)
follows from convexity with respect to p(zK |s˜K) because
p(zK |s˜K) is just a linear combination of p(zK |y˜K), see (9b),
and convexity is preserved under affine transformations [42].
By definition, p(zK , y˜K) = Pr[ZK = zK , Y˜ K = y˜K ],
zK , y˜K ∈ YK . Note that
Pr[ZK = zK , Y˜ K = y˜K ]
= Pr[Z(1) = z(1), . . . , Z(K) = z(K),
Y˜ (1) = y˜(1), . . . , Y˜ (K) = y˜(K)],
for z(i), y˜(j) ∈ Y , i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Using (5), we can
further expand Pr[ZK = zK , Y˜ K = y˜K ] as follows
Pr[ZK = zK , Y˜ K = y˜K ]
= Pr[β
(
(α(Y˜ (1)) + V (1))modNY
)
= z(1), . . . ,
Y˜ (1) = y˜(1), . . . , Y˜ (K) = y˜(K)]
= Pr[V (1) =
(
α(z(1))− α(y˜(1))
)
modNY , . . . ,
Y˜ (1) = y˜(1), . . . , Y˜ (K) = y˜(K)]
(a)
= Pr[V (1) =
(
α(z(1))− α(y˜(1))
)
modNY , . . . ,
V (K) =
(
α(z(K))− α(y˜(K))
)
modNY ] Pr[Y˜
K = y˜K ]
(b)
= Pr[V K =
(
α¯(zK)− α¯(y˜K)
)
modNY ] Pr[Y˜
K = y˜K ]
(c)
= q
((
α¯(zK)− α¯(y˜K)
)
modNY
)
p(y˜K),
where (a) follows from independence between V K and Y˜ K ,
(b) from the definition of α¯(·) in (8), and (c) by con-
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struction of q(vK) since q(vK) = Pr[V K = vk], vk ∈
VK . It follows that p(zK |y˜K) = p(zK , y˜K)/p(y˜K) =
q
((
α¯(zK) − α¯(y˜K)
)
modNY
)
and thus (9d) holds true. It
remains to prove that I[S˜K ;ZK ] is convex in q(vK) for
given p(y˜K) and p(s˜K |y˜K). We have concluded convex-
ity of I[S˜K ;ZK ] with respect to p(zK |y˜K) above. Hence,
because p(zK |y˜K) = q
((
α¯(zK) − α¯(y˜K)
)
modNY
)
and
q
((
α¯(zK) − α¯(y˜K)
)
modNY
)
is a linear transformation of
q(vK) (note that q
((
α¯(zK)− α¯(y˜K)
)
modNY
)
= q(vK) for(
α¯(zK)−α¯(y˜K)
)
modNY = v
K and zero otherwise), the cost
I[S˜K ;ZK ] is convex in q(vK) because convexity is preserved
under affine transformations. 
By Lemma 1, I[S˜K ;ZK ] is convex in our decision variables
q(vK), for given p(s˜K) and p(y˜K |s˜K). Then, if the distortion
constraint, E[||ZK − Y˜ K ||2] ≤ ǫK , is convex in q(vK), and
we know p(s˜K) and p(y˜K |s˜K), we could minimize I[S˜K ;ZK ]
efficiently using off-the-shelf optimization algorithms.
Lemma 2 E[||ZK − Y˜ K ||2] is a linear function of q(vK) for
given p(y˜K), and can be written as follows:
E[||ZK − Y˜K ||2] =
∑
y˜K∈YK
∑
zK∈YK
p(zK , y˜K)
(
z
K − y˜K
)2
,
(10a)
p(zK , y˜K) = q
(
(α¯(zK)− α¯(y˜K))modNY
)
p(y˜K). (10b)
Proof : Define the function d(ZK , Y˜ K) := ||ZK − Y˜ K ||2.
The function d(ZK , Y˜ K) is a deterministic function of two
jointly distributed random vectors, ZK and Y˜ K , with joint
distribution p(zK , y˜K). The joint distribution can be writ-
ten as p(zK , y˜K) = p(zK |y˜K)p(y˜K) (chain rule), and,
by (9d), the conditional probability distribution is given by
p(zK |y˜K) = q
(
(α¯(zK) − α¯(y˜K))modNY (see the proof
of Lemma 1 for details). That is, p(zK |y˜K) is a linear
transformation of q(vK). Therefore, see, e.g., [41] for details,
E[d(ZK , Y˜ K)] =
∑
y˜K∈YK
∑
zK∈YK p(z
K , y˜K)d(zK , y˜K),
and because the joint distribution can be written as
p(zK , y˜K) = q
(
(α¯(zK) − α¯(y˜K))modNY
)
p(y˜K), the ex-
pected distortion E[d(ZK , Y˜ K)] is given by (10), and it is
linear in q(vK) for given p(y˜K). 
By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the cost, I[S˜K ;ZK ], and
constraint, E[||ZK − Y˜ K ||2] ≤ ǫK , are parametrized by
p(s˜K) and p(y˜K |s˜K). To obtain these distributions, we need to
integrate the density of SK and the joint density of (SK , Y K)
(if they are not degenerate) over the quantization cells. By
lifting the system dynamics (1) over {1, . . . ,K}, we can write
the stacked vector ((Y K)⊤, (SK)⊤)⊤ ∈ RK(ns+ny) as[
Y K
SK
]
=
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
FKX(1) +
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
TKM
K−1 (11)
+
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
LKU
K−1 +
[
I
0
]
WK ,
with LK := TK(IK−1⊗B), C˜K := IK ⊗C, D˜K := IK⊗D,
and

FK :=
[
I A⊤ . . . (A⊤)K−1
]⊤
,
TK :=


0 0 0 · · · 0
I 0 0 · · · 0
A I 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
(A)K−2 (A)K−3 (A)K−4 · · · I

 ,
(12)
Lemma 3(
Y K
SK
)
∼ N
[[
C˜K
D˜K
]
FKµ
X
1 +
(
C˜K
D˜K
)
LKU
K−1,ΣY,SK
]
,
with covariance ΣY,SK ∈ R
K(ns+ny)×K(ns+ny), ΣY,SK > 0:
ΣY,SK :=[
I
0
](IK ⊗ Σ
W )[ I
0
]
⊤
+
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
FKΣ
X
1 F
⊤
K
[
C˜K
D˜K
]⊤
+
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
TK(IK−1 ⊗ Σ
M )T⊤K
[
C˜K
D˜K
]⊤
.
(13)
Proof : To simplify notation, we introduce the stacked vec-
tor ΘK := ((Y K)⊤, (SK)⊤)⊤. By assumption, the initial
condition X(1), and the processes, M(k) and W (k), k ∈
N, are mutually independent, and X(1) ∼ N [µX1 ,Σ
X
1 ],
M(k) ∼ N [0,ΣM ], andW (k) ∼ N [0,ΣW ] for some positive
definite covariance matrices ΣX1 , Σ
M , and ΣW . Then, see
[41] for details, we have L1X(1) ∼ N [L1µX1 , L1Σ
X
1 L
⊤
1 ],
L2M
K−1 ∼ N [0, L2(IK−1 ⊗ ΣM )L⊤2 ], and L3W
K ∼
N [0, L3(IK ⊗ ΣW )L⊤3 ], for any deterministic matrices Lj ,
j = 1, 2, 3, of appropriate dimensions. It follows that ΘK =
((Y K)⊤, (SK)⊤)⊤ given in (11) is the sum of a deterministic
vector, [ C˜⊤K D˜⊤K ]
⊤
LKU
K−1, and three independent normally
distributed vectors. Therefore, ΘK follows a multivariate
normal distribution with E[ΘK ] = [ C˜⊤K D˜
⊤
K ]
⊤
FKµ
X
1 +
[ C˜⊤K D˜⊤K ]
⊤
LKU
K−1. By inspection, using the expression of
ΘK in (11), mutual independence among X(1), M(k), and
W (k), k ∈ N, and the definition of ΣX1 , Σ
X
1 := E[(X(1) −
µX1 )(X(1) − µ
X
1 )
⊤], it can be verified that the covariance
matrix of ΘK , E[(ΘK − E[ΘK ])(ΘK − E[ΘK ])⊤], is given
by ΣY,SK in (13). It remains to prove that the distribution of
ΘK is not degenerate, i.e., ΣY,SK > 0. Note that Σ
Y,S
K in (13)
can be written as
ΣY,SK =
[
C˜KQC˜
⊤
K + (IK ⊗ Σ
W ) C˜KQD˜
⊤
K
D˜KQC˜
⊤
K D˜KQD˜
⊤
K
]
, (15)
with Q := FKΣ
X
1 F
⊤
K + TK(IK−1 ⊗ Σ
M )T⊤K . A necessary
condition for the block matrix ΣY,SK in (15) to be positive
definite is that the diagonal blocks are positive definite [43].
The left-upper block is positive definite because ΣW > 0
(which implies (IK ⊗ Σ
W ) > 0 [43]). The right-lower block
is positive definite if D˜K is full row rank and Q is positive
definite. Because D is full row rank by assumption, matrix
D˜K := (IK ⊗D) is also full row rank [44, Theorem 4.2.15].
Note that Q can be factored as follows
Q =
[
FK TK
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
[
ΣX1 0
0 IK−1 ⊗ ΣM
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q′
[
FK TK
]⊤
.
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

min
p(zK |y˜K)
∑
s˜K∈SK
∑
zK∈YK
p(s˜K)
∑
y˜K∈YK
p(y˜K |s˜K)p(zK |y˜K) log
∑
y˜K∈YK p(y˜
K |s˜K)p(zK |y˜K)∑
s˜K∈SK
∑
y˜K∈YK p(s˜
K)p(y˜K |s˜K)p(zK |y˜K)
,
s.t.
∑
y˜K∈YK
∑
zK∈YK
∑
s˜K∈SK
p(s˜K)p(y˜K |s˜K)p(zK |y˜K)
(
zK − y˜K
)2
≤ ǫK ,
p(zK |y˜K) = q
(
(α¯(zK)− α¯(y˜K))modNY
)
,
and, q(vK) ∈ Simplex.
(14)
That is, Q is a linear transformation of the block diagonal
matrix Q′ above. By inspection, it can be verified that matrix
P = [FK TK ], see (12), is lower triangular with identity
matrices on the diagonal; thus, P is invertible. It follows that
Q = PQ′P⊤ is a congruence transformation of Q′ [45]. The
later implies that Q andQ′ have the same signature [45] (equal
number of positive and nonpositive eigenvalues); hence, Q is
positive definite if and only if the block diagonal matrices of
Q′ are positive definite. Matrices ΣX1 and Σ
M are positive
definite by assumption (which implies (IK−1 ⊗ ΣM ) > 0),
and thus we can conclude that Q > 0, which implies
D˜KQD˜
⊤
K > 0 because D˜K is full row rank. Necessary and
sufficient conditions for ΣY,SK > 0 are D˜KQD˜
⊤
K > 0 (which
we have already proved) and that the Schur complement
of block D˜KQD˜
⊤
K of Σ
Y,S
K , denoted as Σ
Y,S
K /D˜KQD˜
⊤
K , is
positive definite [46, Theorem 1.12]. This Schur complement
is given by
ΣY,SK /D˜KQD˜
⊤
K
= (IK ⊗ Σ
W ) + C˜K
(
Q−QD˜⊤K(D˜KQN˜
⊤
K)
−1N˜KQ
)
C˜⊤K .
Since matrix (IK ⊗ ΣW ) is positive definite by construction,
a sufficient condition for ΣY,SK /D˜KQD˜
⊤
K > 0 is
Q′′ := Q−QD˜⊤K(D˜KQN˜
⊤
K)
−1N˜KQ > 0.
Regarding Q′′ as the Schur complement of a higher dimen-
sional matrix Q′′′, we can conclude that:
Q′′ ≥ 0⇐⇒ Q′′′ :=
[
Q QD˜⊤K
D˜KQ D˜KQD˜
⊤
K
]
=
[
Q
D˜KQ
]
Q−1
[
Q QD˜⊤K
]
≥ 0,
which is trivially true because Q−1 is positive definite since
Q > 0. Hence, D˜KQD˜
⊤
K and Σ
Y,S
K /D˜KQD˜
⊤
K are both
positive definite, and thus ΣY,SK > 0. 
To obtain the density of SK , we just marginalize the joint
density N [
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
FKµ
X
1 +
(
C˜K
D˜K
)
LKU
K−1,ΣY,SK ] over Y
K
[41]. We give the density of SK in the following corollary of
Lemma 3.
Corollary 1 SK ∼ N [D˜KFKµX1 + D˜KLKU
K−1,ΣSK ] with
covariance ΣSK =
(
0
Ins
)⊤
ΣY,SK
(
0
Ins
)
∈ RKns×Kns .
Remark 2 Having the joint density of Y K and SK allows
us to compute, for any set of quantization cells {cl, . . . , ci},
l, . . . , i ∈ {1, . . . , NY } and {hr, . . . , hj}, r, . . . , j ∈
{1, . . . , NS}, Pr[S(1) ∈ hr, . . . , S(K) ∈ hj ] and Pr[Y (1) ∈
cl, . . . , Y (K) ∈ ci|S(1) ∈ hr, . . . , S(K) ∈ hj]. By defi-
nition, for s˜(1), . . . , s˜(K) ∈ S, and y˜(1), . . . , y˜(K) ∈ Y ,
p(y˜K |s˜K) = Pr[Y˜ (1) = y˜(1), . . . , Y˜ (K) = y˜(K)|S˜(1) =
s˜(1), . . . , S˜(K) = s˜(K)]. Moreover, by construction of the
quantizers, we have:
Pr[Y˜ (1) = yl, . . . , Y˜ (K) = yi|S˜(1) = sr, . . . , S˜(K) = sj ]
= Pr[Y (1) ∈ cl, . . . , Y (K) ∈ ci|S(1) ∈ hr, . . . , S(K) ∈ hj ]
=
Pr[Y (1) ∈ cl, . . . , Y (K) ∈ ci, S(1) ∈ hr, . . . , S(K) ∈ hj ]
Pr[S(1) ∈ hr, . . . , S(K) ∈ hj ]
,
for any set of quantization levels {yl, . . . , yi}, l, . . . , i ∈
{1, . . . , NY } and {hr, . . . , hj}, r, . . . , j ∈ {1, . . . , NS}.
Therefore, by integrating the joint density N [
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
FKµ
X
1 +(
C˜K
D˜K
)
LKU
K−1,ΣY,SK ] of ((Y
K)⊤, (SK)⊤)⊤ over the quan-
tization cells, we can compute the probability mass functions
p(y˜K |s˜K) and p(s˜K).
In what follows, we pose the nonlinear program for solving
Problem 2.
Theorem 1 Given the system dynamics (1), sensor quantizer
(2), private output quantizer (7), probabilistic mapping (3)-(5),
time horizon K ∈ N, desired distortion level ǫK ∈ R≥0, joint
probability density N [
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
FKµ
X
1 +
(
C˜K
D˜K
)
LKU
K−1,ΣY,SK ]
of ((Y K)⊤, (SK)⊤)⊤ (given in Lemma 6), and corresponding
probability mass functions p(y˜K |s˜K) and p(s˜K), the proba-
bility mass function p(vK) that minimizes I[S˜K ;ZK ] subject
to the distortion constraint, E[||ZK − Y˜ K ||2] ≤ ǫK , can be
found by solving the convex program in (14).
Proof: The expression for the cost and its convexity follow
from Lemma 1. The distortion constraint follows from Lemma
2, and the fact that, because S˜K and ZK are conditionally
independent given Y˜ K , the joint distribution p(zK , y˜K) can
be written as
∑
s˜K∈SK p(s˜
K)p(y˜K |s˜K)p(zK |y˜K). 
Once we have the optimal joint distribution q∗(vK) solution
to (14), we sample from this distribution to obtain an optimal
sequence of realizations V K = (v∗(1), . . . , v∗(K))⊤ that we
induce to system (1) at every time-step, see Figure 1 and Fig-
ure 3. We remark that these realizations are computed a priori,
i.e., before we start running the system. Real-time realizations
of Y (K) are not needed to compute the optimal distorting
distribution. We only require the probability distributions of
the processes driving the system dynamics to cast (14) and
compute q∗(vK).
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Remark 3 Note that, even though working withNK variables
is much more manageable than working with the originalN2K
variables (see Remark 1), having NK variables is still a large
scale optimization problem. Note, however, that (14) is solved
off-line, i.e., because real-time sensor realizations are not re-
quired to perform the optimization–only the distributions of the
processes driving the system are needed–the optimal mappings
can be computed before we start running the system. Moreover,
problem (14) is convex and real-valued. It has a smooth cost
function, bounded variables, and linear constraints. There
exists many algorithms in the literature to solve this class of
large-scale problems efficiently and reasonably fast, see, for
instance, [42], [47], [48].
A. Receding Horizon
For the configuration given in Theorem 1, we have ad-
dressed the problem of designing optimal probabilistic map-
pings to maximize privacy for a finite time horizon K .
Infinite horizon sub-optimal mappings can be designed by
repeatedly solving finite time problems of the form (14) in
a receding horizon fashion. With receding horizon we mean
the following: for each time step, starting at the current time k,
we solve a finite horizon problem of the form (14) over a fixed
horizonK , i.e., over the time window {k, k+1, . . . , k+K−1}.
We sample from the obtained optimal probability distribution
q∗(vk+K−1k ) to obtain an optimal sequence of realizations
V k+K−1k = (v
∗
k(1), . . . , v
∗
k(K))
⊤. We only apply the first
realization, V (k) = v∗k(1), to the system and discard the rest.
Then, for the next time step, k + 1, we solve a new finite
horizon problem over {k+1, k+2, . . . , k+K}, obtain a new
optimal distribution, sample from it, and again only apply the
first optimal realization, V (k+1) = v∗k+1(1), and discard the
rest. We continue shifting the prediction horizon forward to
compute the sequence of receding horizon optimal probability
distributions and realizations.
Note that, besides the desired distortion constant ǫK ,
problem (14) only requires the probability mass func-
tions p(y˜K |s˜K) and p(s˜K) of Y˜ K |S˜K and S˜K , respec-
tively, as input information. Similarly, in a receding hori-
zon formulation, for given horizon length K , we only need
ǫK , and the probability distributions p(y˜
k+K−1
k |s
k+K−1
k )
and p(sk+K−1k ), of Y˜
k+K−1
k |S
k+K−1
k and S
k+K−1
k , respec-
tively, to cast the corresponding optimization problem, where
Y˜ k+K−1k = (Y˜ (k)
⊤, . . . , Y˜ (k + K − 1)⊤)⊤ ∈ YK and
S˜k+K−1k = (S˜(k)
⊤, . . . , S˜(k + K − 1)⊤)⊤ ∈ SK . To
obtain these distributions, we need the density of Sk+K−1k =
(S(k)⊤, . . . , S(k + K − 1)⊤)⊤, and the joint density of
Y k+K−1k = (Y (k)
⊤, . . . , Y (k + K − 1)⊤)⊤ and Sk+K−1k ,
and then integrate them over the quantization cells. By lifting
the system dynamics (1) over {k, k + 1, . . . , k +K − 1}, we
can write the stacked vector ((Y k+K−1k )
⊤, (Sk+K−1k )
⊤)⊤ ∈
R
K(ns+ny), in terms of the current state X(k), as follows[
Y k+K−1k
Sk+K−1k
]
=
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
FKX(k) +
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
TKM
k+K−2
k (16)
+
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
LKU
k+K−2
k +
[
I
0
]
W k+K−1k ,
with LK = TK(IK−1 ⊗B), C˜K = IK ⊗ C, D˜K = IK ⊗D,
and FK and TK as defined in (12).
Lemma 4[
Y
k+K−1
k
S
k+K−1
k
]
∼ N [
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
FKµ
X
k +
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
LKU
k+K−2
k ,Σ
Y,S
k,K ],
where µXk = E[X(k)] = Aµ
X
k−1 + BU(k), positive definite
covariance matrix ΣY,Sk,K , and Σ
Y,S
k,K can be written in terms of
ΣXk = E[(X(k)− µ
X
k )(X(k)− µ
X
k )
⊤] as follows:

ΣXk = AΣ
X
k−1A
⊤ +ΣM ,
ΣY,Sk,K =
[
I
0
]
(IK ⊗ Σ
W )
[
I
0
]⊤
+
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
FKΣ
X
k F
⊤
K
[
C˜K
D˜K
]⊤
+
[
C˜K
D˜K
]
TK(IK−1 ⊗ Σ
M )T⊤K
[
C˜K
D˜K
]⊤
.
(17)
The proof of Lemma 4 follows similar lines as the proof of
Lemma 3 and it is omitted here.
To obtain the density of Sk+K−1k , we marginalize the joint
density of Y k+K−1k and S
k+K−1
k in Lemma 4 over Y
k+K−1
k
[41].
Corollary 2
Sk+K−1k ∼ N [D˜KFKµ
X
k + D˜KLKU
k+K−2
k ,Σ
S
k,K ],
with ΣSk,K :=
[
0
IKns
]⊤
ΣY,Sk,K
[
0
IKns
]
.
Having the joint density of Y k+K−1k and S
k+K−1
k allows
us to compute, for any set of quantization cells, in the
sense of Remark 2 for SK and Y K , the mass functions
p(s˜k+K−1k ) and p(y˜
k+K−1
k |s˜
k+K−1
k ) by numerically integrat-
ing this density over the quantization cells. Hereafter, we
assume that p(s˜k+K−1k ) and p(y˜
k+K−1
k |s˜
k+K−1
k ) are known.
Following a similar reasoning as in Lemma 1, the cost
I[S˜k+K−1k ;Z
k+K−1
k ] can be written in terms of the opti-
mization variables, q(vk+K−1k ), and it can be proved to be
convex. Moreover, following the steps in the proof of Lemma
2, it can be proved that the distortion metric E[||Zk+K−1k −
Y˜ k+K−1k ||
2] is linear in p(zk+K−1k |y˜
k+K−1
k ) for given
p(s˜k+K−1k ) and p(y˜
k+K−1
k |s˜
k+K−1
k ). The conditional distri-
bution p(zk+K−1k |y˜
k+K−1
k ) is a linear function of q(v
k+K−1
k ),
and can be written as p(zk+K−1k |y˜
k+K−1
k ) = q
(
(α¯(zk+K−1k )−
α¯(y˜k+K−1k ))modNY
)
. Therefore, minimizing the mutual in-
formation I[S˜k+K−1k ;Z
k+K−1
k ], using q(v
k+K−1
k ) as opti-
mization variables, subject to E[||Zk+K−1k − Y˜
k+K−1
k ||
2] ≤
ǫK is a convex program. In what follows, we give the proposed
receding horizon scheme.
Receding Horizon Scheme
Input: k,K ∈ N, p(y˜k+K−1k |s˜
k+K−1
k ) = Pr[Y˜
k+K−1
k =
y˜k+K−1k |S˜
k+K−1
k = s˜
k+K−1
k ], y˜
k+K−1
k ∈ Y
K , s˜k+K−1k ∈
SK , p(sk+K−1k ) = Pr[S˜
k+K−1
k = s˜
k+K−1
k ], s˜
k+K−1
k ∈ S
K ,
and ǫK ∈ R>0.
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Fig. 4: (a) Sample path of the output Y (k) and its quantized
version Y˜ (k) (3-bit quantizer); and (b) Sample path of the
private output S(k) and its quantized version S˜(k) (1-bit
quantizer).


q∗(v˜k+K−1k ) := argmin
q(vk+K−1
k
)
I[S˜k+K−1k ; Y˜
k+K−1
k ],
s.t. E[||Zk+K−1k − Y˜
k+K−1
k ||
2] ≤ ǫK ,
p(zk+K−1k |y˜
k+K−1
k )
= q
(
(α¯(zk+K−1k )− α¯(y˜
k+K−1
k ))modNY
)
,
and q
(
vk+K−1k
)
∈ Simplex.
(18)
Output: q∗(v˜k+K−1k ).
Summarizing, for given k, horizon K , and
p(y˜k+K−1k |s
k+K−1
k ) and p(x
k+K−1
k ) corresponding to
the joint density of (Y k+K−1k , S
k+K−1
k ) in Lemma
4, solve problem (18) and denote the corresponding
solution as q∗
(
vk+K−1k
)
. This optimal distribution is
the output of our receding scheme at time k. Once the
optimal distributions have been computed, we sample from
q∗
(
vk+K−1k
)
to obtain an optimal sequence of realizations
V k+K−1k = (v
∗
k(1), . . . , v
∗
k(K))
⊤, and only apply the first
realization, V (k) = v∗k(1), to the system at time k, and discard
the rest. Then, at time k + 1, we sample from q∗
(
vk+Kk+1
)
and only apply the first realization, V (k + 1) = v∗k+1(1), and
discard the rest. We repeat the procedure for increasing k.
V. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
We illustrate the performance of our tools through a case
study of a well stirred chemical reactor with heat exchanger.
This case study has been developed over the years as a
benchmark example for control systems and fault detection,
see, e.g., [49]-[51] and references therein. The state, inputs,
and output of the reactor are:


X(t) =


C0
T0
Tw
Tm

 , U(t) =


Cu
Tu
Tw,u

 , Y (t) = T0,
where


C0 : Concentration of the chemical product,
T0 : Temperature of the product,
Tw : Temperature of the jacket water of heat exchanger,
Tm : Coolant temperature,
Cu : Inlet concentration of reactant,
Tu : Inlet temperature,
Tw,u : Coolant water inlet temperature.
We use the discretized dynamics of the reactor introduced
in [51]. The discrete-time dynamics is of the form (1) with
matrices A,B,C as follows


A =


0.8353 0 0 0
0 0.8324 0 0.0031
0 0.0001 0.1633 0
0 0.0001 0.1633 0


(B|C⊤) =


0.0458 0 0 1
0 0.0457 0 1
0 0 0.0231 0
0 0.0007 0.0006 0


(19)
The original model in [49] does not consider sensor/system
noise and reference signals, we include some arbitrary
noise and references for our simulation experiments. We
consider system and sensor noise with covariance matri-
ces ΣM = diag[0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4] and ΣW = 0.1, re-
spectively, normally distributed initial condition X(1) ∼
N [(6.94; 13.76; 1; 1)⊤, I4], and reference signal U(k) =
(50 cos[0.5k]2, 50 tanh[3k],−70 sin[0.1k])⊤. As private out-
put, we use the concentration of the chemical product; then,
the matrix D in (1) is given by the full row rank matrix
D = (1, 0, 0, 0). The output of the system is the tempera-
ture of the product T0, which could be monitored, e.g., for
quality/safety reasons. Then, the aim of the privacy scheme is
to hide the concentration of the reactant as much as possible
without distorting temperature measurements excessively.
We first consider the receding horizon formulation of
Problem 1, i.e., minimizing I[S˜k+K−1k ;Z
k+K−1
k ] for some
quantized version S˜(k) of the private output S(k), over sliding
windows of the form {k, k + 1, . . . , k +K − 1}, k ∈ N. For
these experiments, we use a 3-bit quantizer for Y (k) (NY = 8)
with levels
Y = {y1, . . . , y8}
= {18.38, 19.04, 19.71, 20.37, 21.04, 21.70, 22.36, 23.03},
and corresponding quantization cells
C = {(−∞, 18.71], (18.71, 19.38], (19.38, 20.04], (20.04, 20.70],
(20.70, 21.37], (21.37, 22.03], (22.03, 22.70], (22.70,∞)}.
For the private output S(k), we use a binary quantizer (NS =
2) with levels S = {s1, s2} = {6.20, 7.68}, and cells H =
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{h1, h2} = {(−∞, 6.94], (6.94,∞)}. These quantizers were
selected based on system trajectories to avoid having always
saturated Y˜ (k) and S˜(k), see Figure 4. Then, for horizonK =
3 and k ∈ N, the stacked quantized output Y˜ k+K−1k (and thus
also Zk+K−1k ) and the stacked private output S˜
k+K−1
k have
alphabets Y3 (with (NY )K = 512 elements) and S3 (with
(NS)
K = 8 elements) given by
Y3 =
{[
y1
y1
y1
]
,
[
y2
y1
y1
]
,
[
y3
y1
y1
]
, . . . ,
[
y6
y8
y8
]
,
[
y7
y8
y8
]
,
[
y8
y8
y8
]}
, (20)
S3 =
{[
s1
s1
s1
]
,
[
s2
s1
s1
]
,
[
s1
s2
s1
]
,
[
s2
s2
s1
]
, . . . ,
[
s1
s2
s2
]
,
[
s2
s2
s2
]}
, (21)
with yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 8, and sj , j ∈ {1, 2}, as intro-
duced above. We let the distorting random process V (k)
(see (3)-(5)) have an alphabet with NV = 5 elements,
i.e., V = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Then, for K = 3, the stacked
vector V k+2k has alphabet V
3 with (NV )
3 = 125 el-
ements. To cast problem (18), we need the probability
mass functions p(y˜k+2k |s˜
k+2
k ) = p(y˜
k+2
k , s˜
k+2
k )/p(s˜
k+2
k ) and
p(s˜k+2k ) =
∑
s˜
k+2
k
∈S3 p(y˜
k+2
k , s˜
k+2
k ), y˜
k+2
k ∈ Y
3, s˜k+2k ∈ S
3.
These distributions are fully characterized by the joint pmf,
p(y˜k+2k , s˜
k+2
k ), y˜
k+2
k , s˜
k+2
k ∈ Y
3 × S3, where the alphabet
Y3 × S3 is given by
Y3 × S3 =




y1
y1
y1
s1
s1
s1


,


y2
y1
y1
s1
s1
s1


, . . . ,


y7
y8
y8
s1
s1
s1


,


y8
y8
y8
s1
s1
s1


, (22)


y1
y1
y1
s2
s1
s1


, . . . ,


y8
y8
y8
s2
s1
s1


, . . . ,


y8
y8
y8
s3
s3
s3




, (23)
with |Y3 × S3| = (NYNS)3 = 4096. We integrate (in the
sense of Remark 6) the joint density of Y k+2k and S
k+2
k (given
in Lemma 4) over the quantization cells, C and H, to obtain
p(y˜k+2k , s˜
k+2
k ) (and thus also p(s˜
k+2
k ) and p(y˜
k+2
k |s˜
k+2
k )) for
k ∈ {1, . . . , 25}. In Figure 5(a), we show the joint probability
mass function p(y˜31 , s˜
3
1), y˜
3
1 , s˜
3
1 ∈ Y
3 × S3. The mass points
are indexed following the ordering logic in (23). Figure 5(b)
depicts the joint pmf p(y˜k+2k , s˜
k+2
k ), k = 1, . . . , 25, for the
first 256 mass points of the alphabet Y3 × S3 (indexed as in
(23)); and, in Figure 5(c), we show zooms of the probabilities
of the first six mass points for increasing k. Note that there is
a lot of variability in the probabilities of the mass points as k
increases.
Next, for given p(y˜k+2k , s˜
k+2
k ), we show results of the
receding horizon scheme (18) for horizon K = 3,
k = 1, 2, . . . , 25, and three different levels of distortion,
ǫK = ∞, 7, 3, where ǫK = ∞ means that the optimization
problems in (18) are solved without considering the distortion
constraint. In Figure 6, we show the optimal distorting dis-
tribution q∗(v21) for ǫK = ∞ and, in Figure 7, the evolution
(of the first sixteen mass points) of the optimal distribution
q∗(vk+2k ) solution to (18) for increasing k and ǫK =∞, 7, 2.
The mass points are indexed following the ordering logic in
(23). Note that there is a lot of probability variability both
among mass points and in time (as k grows). The optimal
distorting distributions follow some nontrivial patterns that
depend on the dynamics, quantizer, and desired distortion
level. Further note that even the unconstraint formulation
(ǫK = ∞) does not lead to uniform distributions; and, as
ǫK → 0, the sequence of optimal distributions q∗(v
k+2
k )
concentrates most of its probability at the first mass point (the
zero vector). This is what one would expect as the zero vector
leads to no distortion. For ǫK = ∞, 7, 2, Figure 8 depicts
the evolution of the optimal cost I[S˜k+K−1k ;Z
k+K−1
k ] and
the mutual information I[S˜k+K−1k ; Y˜
k+K−1
k ]. As expected,
I[S˜k+K−1k ;Z
k+K−1
k ] decreases for increasing ǫK uniformly
in k. The mutual information I[S˜k+K−1k ; Y˜
k+K−1
k ] in Figure
8(b) characterizes the disclosed information if no privacy
preserving mapping was in place. Finally, in Figure 9, we
show the joint probability distributions p(z31 , s˜
3
1) and p(y˜
3
1 , s˜
3
1)
for ǫK = ∞ and ǫK = 2. Note that, as one would expect,
p(z31 , s˜
3
1) → p(y˜
3
1 , s˜
3
1) as ǫK → 0. That is, as we allow for
less distortion, we have less freedom to reshape p(y˜31 , s˜
3
1) by
passing Y˜ 31 through p(y˜
3
1 , z˜
3
1) before transmission.
We remark that all the above computations were made on
a PC, Intel 2.70 GHz, in Matlab 2015b.
VI. CONCLUSION
For a class of Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPSs), we have
presented a detailed mathematical framework built around
systems theory, information theory, and convex optimization
to deal with privacy problems raised by the use of pub-
lic/unsecured communication networks to transmit sensor data.
In particular, to prevent adversaries from obtaining an accurate
estimate of the private part of the system state, we have
provided tools (in terms of convex programs) to optimally
randomize (via some probabilistic mappings) sensor data be-
fore transmission for a desired level of distortion. That is,
given a maximum level of distortion tolerated by a particular
application, we give tools to synthesize probabilistic mappings
that maximize privacy (in the sense of hiding the private
output as much as possible) while satisfying the distortion
constraint on the original sensor data. Our tools are capable
of dealing with the dynamic and non-stationary nature of
CPSs at the price of having to solve some medium to large
scale optimization problems. We have presented extensive
simulation experiments to show the performance of out tools.
Note that we have found some nontrivial distorting probability
distributions that highly depend on the system dynamics,
quantizer, and desired distortion level.
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Fig. 5: (a) Joint pmf p(y˜31 , s˜
3
1), y˜
3
1, s˜
3
1 ∈ Y
3×S3; (b) Joint pmf
p(y˜k+2k , s˜
k+2
k ), k = 1, . . . , 25, for the first 256 mass points;
and (c) Zoom of the probabilities of the first six mass points
for increasing k .
Fig. 6: Optimal distorting distribution q∗(v21) for ǫK =∞.
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